IRON DOME: EFFECTIVE AND EXPENSIVE

 The inability of the United Nations peacekeeping forces to stay entrenched in Gaza terror activity has been a major hindrance to both the Palestinian and Israeli population in the region.  The UN has repeatedly displayed their impotent strategy in local Gaza towns and villages resulting in the assassination of top PRC officials. This, in turn, sparked the retaliating muster of misguided rocket fire from Palestinian militia units in the region. 

The elimination of Zuhair al-Qaissi, the secretary general of the Popular Resistance Committee is the direct result of lax UN military commitment to the terrorist operations in the Gaza strip. IDF officials made it clear that Qaissi had other intentions for the citizens of nearby Israeli villages and townships. According to Israeli officials, he is the responsible party involved in the kidnapping of the youthful Israeli Soldier Gilad Shilat in 2006.  His recently planned trip to the Sinai was not intended for peace or negotiation. Paperwork disguised as a colorful snorkeling excursion was painted over with an underlining message of mass murder in the Sinai Region. IDF phone taps and wireless infiltration once again proved his alternate plans.

In the Harretz article by Gili Cohen and Yanir Yagna regarding the latest use of the Iron Dome, the author lightly touches on the reasons for the attacks and gives absolutely no mention as to what initiated the rocket launches in the first place.  With nothing more than a brief mention of an extremely brittle Egyptian cease fire, only the regional aspects of the conflict are noted.  The villages of Netivot and Be’er  Sheva, where the happenings took place are evident, but there is still no mention of the Israeli assassination of the PRC official.  This is the most important part of this conflict, yet it is completely omitted.   The only legitimate, reliable information within this report informs the reader that schools and civic duties were shut down in the five cities of Be'er Sheva, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Kiryat Malakhi and Gan Yavneh. Other than simple reporting of an incident, this article's reliability lacks an enormous amount of information.

Furthermore, there is no historical reference or detail involving the UN presence or assassination of Zuhair al-Qaissi, who was responsible for a terrorist attack that killed 8 Israelis.  There is no assessment of casualty and the author implies nothing about the randomness in regards to how the militants extend their missile delivery.

In contrast to Cohen and Yagna, the research and relativity of the article posted by Rick Moran employs the reader with vast knowledge of the situation.  Important facts regarding the four, and soon to be five more Iron Dome units deployed as well civilian casualties.  There is also background deployed to seat the reader on the frustration felt by Israelis and Palestinians in the region.  

Moran outlines the cost and links the reader’s consciousness with a hint of Palestinian animosity when noting the responsible donors for the financing of Iron Dome. Respectfully, his mention of the substantial $205 million donated by the U.S. in assistance for its’ manufacturing, underlines how deeply involved the Americans are in the conflict. He then gives another wink to the reader and implies how Congress has again authorized another $200 million in the near future.  More Info.

Moran has a stronger grasp of the atmosphere on the ground as well as militarily, giving history on the assassination along with the reason for a delay in the hit.  He assists the reader on the reason for the both sides retaliating. 

 Informing the reader on Iron Dome stats and tactics is important to understanding the value of the new defense system.

                                                                Operation Statistics

 Developed originally to shield Israel from Hezbollah attacks in the southern zone of the Lebanese border, they are essential to the million citizens in range of enemy missile attacks. Manufactured by the Israeli owned firm Rafael Advanced Defense Systems, the missile stations provide a quality 90% success rate. They have no problem taking out Iranian Qassam or Soviet Grad missiles known for a cruise range of anywhere from 5 to 15 miles. Iron dome Interceptors cruise much faster than opponent projectiles at a range of 4 to 70 miles. Transported by truck, they carry a warhead capable of mid-air detonation. Deployment is triggered with software developed by Israeli defense firm Elta. More Info

                                                                        The Cost

Although the success rate of Iron Dome has proven its worth over the last year, its future is still unknown.  In order for the operation to flourish, U.S. aid is mandatory. As we see here in Yossi Melmann's examination of the incidents, the monetary expense of this defense literally skyrockets after each use. The cost of one Iron Dome Defense missile is upwards of $100,000. Shooting off 10 or 12 of these can ruin the budget, not to mention the complete halt to civilian life on the ground in surrounding Iron Dome outposts.

Despite the alarming cost, the southern part of the country where the Negev region is an extremely sensitive issue for the IDF, residents more than welcome the new mobile security units. Considering the ineffective Mubarak regime has allowed for limited security and unauthorized Bedouin patrols, Iron Dome is will be heavily relied upon. The patrols are well-known for disruption of civilian transit and critical pipeline routes. PRC Grad rocket fire is also extremely common in this area.

PRC Militia fighter displaying Grad Rocket prior to launch.

With Iran funding heavy artillery along with large caches of rockets to Hamas and  its PRC Militias, Israel's only alternative for protecting its citizens from the consistent aimless attacks has been air strikes followed by duck and cover Iron Dome Interceptors.   The urge to provide more units is high on the IDF’s itinerary, but they also understand the massive investment and realize they are not ballistic missile defense worthy.  Israel has no large missile defense system and the threat of large 750 pound warhead penetrating Israeli airspace becomes ever more real by the day.